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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
QUESTAR BUILDERS, INC. v. CB FLOORING, LLC: THE 
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING APPLY TO THE PARTY EXERCISING ITS 
DISCRETION TO TERMINATE PRIVATE PARTY 
CONTRACTS THAT INCORPORATE A "TERMINATION 
FOR CONVENIENCE" CLAUSE. 
By: K. Alice Young 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that two private parties contracting for goods or services may include contract language 
allowing termination for convenience, but the party with discretion to 
terminate must use good faith. Questar Builders, Inc. v. CB Flooring, 
LLC, 410 Md. 241, 261, 978 A.2d 651, 663 (2009). Specifically, in 
the absence of a breach, the terminating party must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it exercised its discretion in 
accordance with the common law contract principles of good faith and 
fair dealing. Id. at 281 n.25, 978 A.2d at 675 n.25. 
After fielding bids from three companies, Questar Builders, Inc. 
("Questar"), the contractor responsible for a large-scale residential 
construction project, signed an agreement ("Subcontract") with CB 
Flooring, LLC ("CB Flooring"). The Subcontract, signed on 
September 29, 2005, detailed that CB Flooring would purchase and 
install carpets throughout the project in exchange for payments 
totaling $1,120,000. The Subcontract contained clauses granting 
Questar the discretion to terminate the contract for its convenience, 
even if CB Flooring did not breach the contract. Known as a 
"termination for convenience" clause, the contract gave Questar 
discretion to terminate even if neither side breached. 
In January, the project's interior decorator 'submitted drawings 
that included an allegedly higher-priced flooring product than that 
upon which CB Flooring based its original bid. On February 27, 
Questar began negotiating a different flooring agreement with CT!, 
one of the two companies that CB Flooring had initially outbid. On 
March 23, Questar's Senior Vice President, Frank Maccherone 
("Maccherone"), terminated the Subcontract in a letter to CB Flooring. 
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Maccherone then entered a new, nearly identical, signed agreement 
with CTI a few weeks later. In his termination letter, Maccherone 
alleged that CB Flooring breached by refusing to perform after 
Questar's interior decorator drawings specified materials differing 
from those in the bid-upon plans. Maccherone also claimed that, 
based on the Subcontract, even if CB Flooring had not breached, 
Questar had an unlimited right to terminate the Subcontract for its 
convenience and that Questar owed no compensation to CB Flooring. 
In April 2006, CB Flooring sued Questar for breach of contract in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. CB Flooring claimed that 
Questar acted in bad faith. Questar countered that CB Flooring's 
refusal to perform under the contract and failure to attend weekly 
meetings justified its termination. In the alternative, Questar alleged 
that the Subcontract secured its right to terminate the agreement at its 
convenience, claiming this as an unlimited right. Questar contended 
that, even if the right was not unlimited, it could base its termination 
for convenience on a subjective loss of confidence resulting from CB 
Flooring's absence from weekly meetings. 
The circuit court found that CB Flooring did not breach the 
Subcontract. The trial judge found that CB Flooring's absence from 
the weekly meetings did not constitute a material breach; that it did not 
attempt to use the change order as leverage; and that it did not 
jeopardize the timely perfonnance of the Subcontract. The trial judge 
also rejected Questar's alternative defense that its subjective loss of 
faith in CB Flooring's ability to perform met the requirement for the 
convenience clause. Questar challenged neither the ruling that CB 
Flooring did not breach nor the amount of damages awarded to CB 
Flooring. Questar appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, but before arguments could be heard, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative. 
The court began its analysis by reviewing the Civil War-era 
development of government contract risk management clauses that 
relied on the uncertainties of war to justify the governmental voiding 
of contracts on short notice. Questar, 410 Md. at 262, 978 A.2d at 
663-64. This discretion in contracts with manufacturers and suppliers 
enabled the government to avoid expectation damages, but provided 
for equitable compensation for capital already invested. Id. at 264-65, 
978 A.2d at 665 (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 
U.S. 514, 523 (1923)). During World War II, the word "convenience" 
came to be associated with this type of discretionary clause, and its 
purpose was to allow the government freedom to tenninate a contract 
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when justified by exigencies and uncertainties of war. Id. at 266, 978 
A.2d at 666. 
The court then explained that, in the 1960's, the government 
expanded its use of these "termination for convenience" clauses in 
peacetime military and non-military contracts. Id. Maryland also uses 
"termination for convenience" clauses in contracts with the state 
government. Id. at 267 n.17, 978 A.2d at 666 n.17. The court 
clarified that, when a party can cancel a contract without cause or 
penalty, the contract is illusory, and that courts construe contracts to 
avoid illusory interpretations. Id. at 267-68,978 A.2d at 667. In order 
to uphold the discretionary use of convenience clauses without 
rendering the contracts illusory, courts limit government rights by 
applying standards for termination. Questar, 410 Md. at 268, 978 
A.2d at 667. The strong presumption of good faith in government 
contracts cases, however, renders it nearly impossible for opponents to 
prove government breach in the face of "termination for convenience." 
Id. at 271, 978 A.2d at 669. The court explained that broad 
government discretion to terminate contracts for convenience derives 
from the incidents of sovereignty. Id. at 271-72, 978 A.2d at 669-70. 
The court then analyzed the application of a "termination for 
convenience" clause in private contracts that are governed by common 
law principles instead of principles of sovereignty. Id. In private 
party contracts, the cancelling party must exercise its discretion in 
good faith and in accordance with fair dealing, because the right to 
cancel is not an unfettered power. Id. at 274, 978 A.2d at 671. In the 
instant case, the court noted that the common law contract principles 
of good faith and fair dealing limited Questar's discretion to terminate 
for convenience. Id. The court explained that, without common law 
contract principles providing guidelines and restrictions, the contract 
would be rendered illusory. Questar, 410 Md. at 278-79,978 A.2d at 
673-74. (citing Cheek v. United Healthcare a/the Mid-Atl., Inc., 378 
Md. 139, 142-43, 835 A.2d 656, 658 (2003)). Convenience clauses 
help parties manage risks due to changing technology, but common 
law principles of good faith and fair dealing prohibit arbitrary contract 
termination. Id. at 280, 978 A.2d at 674. 
Continuing its analysis, the court noted that the trial judge correctly 
recognized that Questar's "gut feeling" was sufficient to trigger 
"termination for convenience." Id. at 280, 978 A.2d at 675. The trial 
judge, however, did not articulate findings regarding whether Questar 
acted in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 280-81, 
978 A.2d at 675. The court instructed that good faith and fair dealing 
should be measured objectively according to the reasonable 
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expectations of the parties, as derived from the contract language. Id. 
at 282, 978 A.2d at 675-76. Finally, the court suggested that the trial 
court may find on remand that Questar acted in bad faith if the 
termination was not commercially reasonable, if it sought a better 
bargain, or if it simply wanted to evade its obligation to perform. Id. 
at 283-84,978 A.2d at 676-77. 
The standard for judging the use of a "termination for convenience" 
clause in government contracts leans heavily toward accepting the 
discretion of the government. In contracts between private parties, 
however, the common law principles of good faith and fair dealing 
apply. Private parties must understand that a "termination for 
convenience" clause is not a carte blanche right to terminate for any 
reason, because an unfettered right to terminate would render a 
contract illusory. Rather, in order to legitimately terminate under that 
clause, the party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
its decision satisfies an objective standard according to the reasonable 
expectations of the other party and that it exercised good faith and fair 
dealing. The Court of Appeals of Maryland preserved this risk 
management tool for use by private parties but underscored the need 
for common law contract protections. Maryland practitioners must 
make convenience clauses clear so that courts can easily determine the 
parties' objective expectations in the event of "termination for 
convenience. " 
